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NOTE
CHANGING THE PAST: THE RIGHT OF A POST-
REGULATION ACQUIRER TO CHALLENGE A
REGULATION
Eliezer Drew*
A landowner can make a takings challenge of a statute or regula-
tion that interferes with his right to develop his land. The success of
this challenge will depend on one of two things or sometimes both:
the extent to which the regulation interferes with his investment-
backed expectations ("IBE") at the time of acquisition and whether
the right that is being interfered with is one that he acquired at the
time of his acquisition in the owner's bundle of rights ("OBR"). The
extent of the right to challenge a statute is unclear when the owner
challenging the regulation acquired the land after the regulation be-
came law. In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island' in which the Court both further defined and left open to fur-
ther debate the IBE and OBR of a subsequent acquirer.
This note attempts to explain the history of IBE and OBR, what
the Court did in Palazzolo, and where the law stands today. Part I
lays out the evolution of IBE and OBR in the Supreme Court leading
up to the Palazzolo case. Part II highlights some important lower
court cases before Palazzolo that suggest a split in how to apply the
Supreme Court guidelines. Part III will explain the Palazzolo deci-
sion. It will go through the basic facts and the different opinions.
Part IV looks at the lower courts that have had a chance to apply the
Palazzolo decision to new cases. The Conclusion discusses where
the law is now and where it is headed.
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I. HISTORY OF IBE AND OBR THROUGH LUCAS
The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment 2 requires the federal
government to compensate an individual when the government takes
his or her property. The Court later incorporated this part of the Bill
of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment3 and made it similarly applicable against the states.4 Until
1922, the takings clause only applied when the government actually
took title or possession of the land.
The landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co v. Mahon5 changed
the boundaries of the takings clause. Many believe that here the
court first acknowledged the concept of regulatory takings. 6 The
Court, in Pennsylvania Coal, acknowledged that the government
cannot work without having an incidental affect on property values,
but noted that when a regulation goes so far as to deny some core
property rights then the regulation will be considered a taking.
7
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V ( "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation").
3. Id. at amend. X1V, § 4 ("nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law").
4. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 160 (1980). Noting in Justice Blackmun's decision, "That pro-
hibition, of course, applies against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment" (citing Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897) as the source of this application of the Fourteenth
Amendment.). In Chicago, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court,
explained that if the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to have any real meaning, the states must provide for a fair
process and fair compensation before property may be taken. Chi-
cago, 166 U.S. at 235.
5. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
6. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1014 (1992); but see William Michael Treanor, Jam For Jus-
tice Holmes, 86 Geo. L.J. 813 (1998)(arguing that although the
popular conception of Mahon is that is was the beginning of regula-
tory takings, that is a misreading of the case and what Justice
Holmes really meant).
7. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. The exact words of the court were,
"The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
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In 1978, the Court decided the case of Penn Central v. City of New
York.8 Here the Court established a new way to evaluate regulatory
takings. The Court recognized three main factors that were to be
used when evaluating a regulatory takings cases: (1) "the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant" 9; (2) the extent to which
the refulation "interfered with distinct investment backed expecta-
tions" 0; and (3) the "character of the government action."" These
factors became the backbone of what has now become known as the
"Penn Central test."
A year later the Court decided Kaiser Aetna v. United States.12 In
this case, then Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, changed the
wording in Penn Central from "distinct investment backed expecta-
tions" 13 to "reasonable investment backed expectations."' 14 This
difference in wording has had a significant impact on how the courts
would later apply the IBE factor of the Penn Central test.' 5
In 1987, the Court decided Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.16 In Nollan, the Court and Justice Brennen disagreed over
whether knowledge of a regulation should affect the Nollans' right to
compensation. The Court ruled, "so long as the Commission could
not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compen-
sating them, the prior owners must be understood to have transferred
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."
8. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
9. Id. at 124.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
13. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added).
14. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added).
15. The courts can second-guess an owner's expectations because
the standard is reasonableness. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189
F.3d 1355 (1999) (describing the owner expectations as unreason-
able in light of the regulatory winds blowing at the time of invest-
ment); see also Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct.
Cl. 1981) (describing the owner's expectations to receive a permit
under the standards then in use as too broad because the government
could at anytime raise what the standards for granting a permit will
be).
16. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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their full property rights in conveying the lot."' 7 Thus the right to
keep that property free from the state's easement was part of the new
owners' - the Nollans - bundle of rights. This precedent would later
be relied on by the Court to decide the Palazzolo case. Justice Bren-
nen dissented, saying knowledge of the restriction should have pre-
cluded any compensation.1
8
In 1992, the Court decided Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil.19 The Court decided that when a regulation depletes all value
there is a per se taking.20 Lucas also said that anything that is part of
the background principles of the property laws of the state - and
therefore not Fart of the OBR - may be regulated without paying
compensation.
II. IBE AND OBR BEFORE PALAZZOLO
After Penn Central and Lucas, lower courts were divided as to
when a regulation would became part of the background principles
mentioned in Lucas. In some jurisdictions, prior notice by a buyer
was sufficient for a regulation to be considered a background princi-
ple for that buyer. Many courts would apply Penn Central and Lu-
cas as one test and once a regulation was found to be part of the
background principles - and therefore not part of the owner's OBR -
the court would deny compensation without discussing IBE.2 a
Other courts recognized that Penn Central and Lucas were two
distinct tests for different factual circumstances, but they would still
deny compensation based on a lack of IBE or a right missing from
the OBR. The courts would apply a Lucas test where the regulation
17. Id. at 834 n.2.
18. Id. at 866 (Brennen, J., dissenting).
19. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
20. Id. at 1019.
21. Id. at 1023.
22. See Hunzicker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994). This
talismanic approach concerned Justice O'Connor. See Palazzolo,
533 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., Adams Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of East
Lansing, 614 N.W.2d 634 (Mich. 2000) cert. denied 532 U.S. 920
(2001).
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24
claimed to take away all economical use of the parcel in question.
However, if the regulation did not take away all economical use, but
rather it was just alleged that the regulation took too much, then they
would apply a Penn Central balancing test.25 The difference be-
tween the two tests would lay where the trial court makes an indi-
vidual analysis of each case: in a Lucas situation, so long as the
claimant could establish he had lost all economic value, he would
recover without a balancing of the governmental interests.26 If the
land had not lost all economic value then each case would get a case-
specific balancing test.
2 7
I will call these courts that denied compensation whenever the new
owner had notice of the regulation "Notice Courts."
Other jurisdictions held that mere knowledge at the time of pur-
chase does not make a regulation part of the background principles
and have required more than just notice to make law part of the
background principles. These jurisdictions will be referred to as
"No-Notice Courts."
A. "Notice Courts" Generally Find That Acquisition with Notice of
the Regulation is Fatal to a Property Owners' Suit
Before Palazzolo, several appellate courts ruled that notice of the
regulation meant that the owner had no reasonable IBE because the
law was part of the background property principles.
28
Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Board" is a good example
of the IBE factor from a Penn Central test. Claridge was decided
six years before Lucas, and the language the court uses is that of
IBE. The Claridges wanted to fill in wetlands on their property,
which they had purchased after the regulations were enacted. When
they were denied a permit they filed an inverse condemnation suit
In Palazzolo the Supreme Court definitively decided that Penn Cen-
tral and Lucas are two different tests for two different factual situa-
tions. Palazzolo, 530 U.S. at 632.
24. Id. at 638.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. These include cases from Iowa, New Hampshire, Michigan,
New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia.
29. 485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984).
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against the New Hampshire Wetlands Board. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court ruled, "[a] person who purchases land with notice of
statutory impediments to the right to develop that land can justify
few, if any, legitimate investment backed expectations of develop-
mental rights which rise to the level of constitutionally protected
rights.",30 The court further stated that if compensation was allowed,
the state would be de facto guaranteeing investment risks through the
inverse condemnation process.3' The court, therefore, denied com-
pensation for a lack of IBE under the Penn Central test because of
notice.
In Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Commission,32 the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court ruled that because the regulation predated
Grant's ownership of the parcel, he never had the right to fill in the
land.33 Because this rifht was not part of Grant's OBR, under Lucas
there was no taking.3  The court did not mention Penn Central,
much less differentiate between the Penn Central test and the Lucas
test. The court, in denying compensation, relied solely on the right
to fill not being in Grant's OBR under Lucas.35
In Adams Outdoor Advertising Co v. City of East Lansing,36 the
Michigan Supreme Court recognized that Penn Central and Lucas
were separate tests. But, because Adams obtained its lease after the
regulation was in place, they never obtained the property interest that
had been regulated by the City of East Lansing, which therefore was
not part of Adams' OBR.
In Good v. United States,37 the Federal Circuit found that because
at the time that Good acquired the property there already was an ex-
tensive regulatory system in place, Good should have foreseen
stricter rules and therefore he had no reasonable IBE.38 The Court
then added, "[b]ecause we find the expectations factor dispositive,
30. Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. 461 S.E.2d 388 (S.Ct. 1995).
33. Id. at 391.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 614 N.W.2d 634 (Mich. 2000).
37. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed Cir. 1999).
38. Id. at 1361.
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we will not further discuss the character of the government action or
the economic impact of the regulation."
39
These four cases illustrate how one school makes the property-
acquisition where a regulation is in place fatal to any future takings
claim. Several states filed an amici brief in the Palazzolo case in
sup.ort of Rhode Island, setting out a reason for why this should be
so. 4  The brief explains that this bright line rule is the "flipside to
the Takings Doctrine's proscription against singling out landowners
to bear societal burdens - landowners, not society at large, must bear
the consequences of their own actions. 41  The amicus means that
the risk the owner took in purchasing such property should not be
subsidized by the state later paying the difference between the value
at the time the property was purchased and what it could be worth
absent the regulation.42 The amicus wants to limit IBE to only those
development rights that would actually be legal at the time of pur-
chase - irrespective of what economic effect those regulations had
on the developmental potential of that parcel. 43 This was the prevail-
ing view of IBE and OBR in most jurisdictions until the Palazzolo
decision.44
39. Id. at 1360. Compare this last quote from Good to Justice
O'Connor's concern with the courts lifting IBE to dispositive status.
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. Brief of the States of California, Alaska, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Vermont and Washington, the District of Columbia and the United
States Virgin Islands as Amici Curiae in support of the respondents.
1999 U.S. Briefs 2047.
41. Id. at23.
42. They distinguish Nollan as a physical taking and therefore
inapposite. Id. at 24 n.9.
43. Id. at 24.
44. Robert Meltz, What Role Does the Law Existing When a
Property is Acquired Have in Analyzing a Later Taking Claim?: The
"Notice Rule", 384 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE -AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY (May 3, 2001)(contrasting ten state final courts of appeal and
three federal circuits holding for the Notice Rule to one Supreme
Court decision, one concurrence and one dissent from a federal cir-
2003]
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B. No-Notice Courts Do Not Deny Suits Merely Because of Prior
Notice
In a 1965 pre-Penn Central case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
stated the best explanation as to why post-regulation acquisition
should not affect the new owner's right to compensation.45 Filister
v. City of Minneapolis involved a plaintiff who purchased property
13 years after the zoning ordinance was enacted and then sued,
claiming that the residential zoning denied him all economic use of
46the land. The lower court denied compensation in part because
Filister had knowledge of regulation when he purchased the prop-
47erty. While affirming the denial of compensation on other
grounds, the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly declined to use the
knowledge as grounds to deny compensation. The court stated "[W]e
tend to the view that knowledge of the restriction does not in itself
create an estoppel if the ordinance has at the time of its adoption de-
prived the property of all practical use. There is no logical reason
why one who purchases with notice of such an ordinance but has
sufficient vision and initiative to believe that the property is illegally
zoned should not have the same standing he would have enjoyed had
he been the owner at the time the ordinance was adopted. Nor do we
believe the amount of the consideration is entitled to any weight.
There should not be one rule for a purchaser who drives a hard bar-
gain and a different rule for one who pays a more substantial
,A48price. This opinion offers the clearest statement of why an owner
should be allowed to challenge a regulation in place when he pur-
chased the property.
In a more recent case, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey
Superior Court relied on Nollan to allow a new owner to press the
same claims and IBE as his predecessor in interest.49 The court said
that so long as the original owners had the requisite IBE, then the
cuit and two state midlevel appellate courts to dismiss the Notice
Rule).
45. Filister v. City of Minneapolis, 133 N.W.2d 500 (Minn.
1965).
46. Id. at 501.
47. Id. at 502.
48. Id. at 504.
49. East Cape May v. State of New Jersey, 300 N.J.Super. 325
(1997).
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subsequent owner could use those IBEs to pursue an inverse con-
demnation claim against the state.50 The court still required the rest
of the Penn Central analysis to be satisfied in the lower court before
a taking could be established.5'
There is a similar decision from the Court of Appeals of Michigan.
In K & K Construction, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources,52
the court relied on Nollan to allow a subsequent owner to use the
previous owner's IBE to press an inverse condemnation claim.
53
The court ruled that the timing of the regulation and ownership
should not preclude just compensation that would otherwise be
due. 5
4
In Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v. City of Burlington,55 the Eighth Cir-
cuit distinguished the Penn Central test from the Lucas test. The
56court also made a distinction between IBE and OBR. The court
stated that IBEs only applied in a Penn Central analysis while OBR
was relevant in Lucas tests. 57 The court explained that the Lucas test
was for a categorical taking and therefore the IBE of the owner did
not matter as long as the right was in the owner's OBR the regula-
tion would cause a taking. 58 The Penn Central test, however, is for a
balancing test where IBE plays a major role in determining if there
has been a taking.59 Of course, if the right in question was not part
of the owner's OBR then the IBE would be very unreasonable.
60
The court found that because Outdoor Graphics had known of the
regulation and obtained a profit, its IBE had been met. While Out-
door Graphics was denied any compensation the court did not out-
right dismiss the IBE claim because the regulation predated the ac-
50. Id. at 337.
51. Id. at 338.
52. 217 Mich.App. 56 (1996) (overruled by Adams Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co. v. City of East Lansing, 614 N.W.2d 634 (Mich. 2000);
cert. denied 532 U.S. 920 (2001)).
53. Id. at64.
54. Id.
55. 103 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1996).
56. Id. at 695.
57. Id. at 694.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
2003]
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quisition of title. The court viewed it as only one factor in the
greater Penn Central analysis.
It is these two competing views about the role of IBE and OBR of
a subsequent purchaser which the Supreme Court addressed in the
Palazzolo case. It was hoped that the court would provide a definite
answer as to which view should predominate.
III. THE PALAZZOLO CASE
A. Case History
In 1978, Anthony Palazzolo obtained the parcel in question, after
the state revoked Shore Gardens Inc.'s (SGI) corporate charter.6'
Palazzolo was the sole shareholder and became the new owner.
62
When SGI owned the land, they made three applications to develop
the land, all of which were denied, and the Rhode Island legislature
passed two new statutes affecting the property. 63 After Palazzolo
obtained the land, he twice applied for permits to fill in part of the
wetlands on his property and was rejected both times, after which he
filed an inverse condemnation suit in Rhode Island state court under
a Lucas theory.64 Palazzolo claimed that his property was worth
$3.35 million absent the new regulations and it had been devalued to
$200,000. In Lucas, the Court said that when the regulation deprives
the owner of "all economically viable use" then compensation is
warranted. Palazzolo claimed the state could not circumvent that
rule by leaving him such a small fraction of value and claim that not
all use was lost.65 The trial court ruled against Palazzolo, finding
that no compensable taking had occurred.66
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment on four grounds: (1) the claim was not ripe; (2) Palazzolo had
no right to contest the regulations that predate his ownership because
it was not part of his OBR; (3) because Palazzolo was left with
61. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 711 (R.I.
2000).
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$200,000 there was no Lucas claim; and (4) that because he acquired
the property after the regulation was passed he had no reasonable
67IBE claims under Penn Central. Palazzolo then appealed to the
Supreme Court.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Court's decision dealt primarily with two of the four grounds
on which the Rhode Island Supreme Court relied in its decision -
ripeness, and that the regulation predated Palazzolo's title was fatal
to a takings claim. Justice Kennedy first explained why the case was
ripe for review. 68 The Court then addressed the issue of whether the
fact that Palazzolo obtained the property after the regulation was in
effect precludes any regulatory takings claims.69 The Court affirmed
the dismissal of the Lucas claim saying there was not a complete
taking. The Court reversed the holding that the Penn Central test
was not applicable to cases where the property was acquired after
the regulation, and remanded the case for further evaluation under
Penn Central.7 ° On the application of Penn Central, there were
three different opinions from the court. The final outcome on the
role that post-regulation acquisition of title has on the Penn Central
analysis is not definitive because there is no clear majority holding
from the Court on the point.7'
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained that the state
should not be allowed to put an expiration date on the takings clause
by barring any claims after the transfer of title in part II B of the
opinion. 72 While the Court acknowledged that the state has a right to
use its police powers to put restrictions on property rights, they may
67. Id. at 714.
68. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626. Justice Stevens also joined this
section of the Court's opinion. Id. at 638 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 617.
71. As will be explained later, the four dissenting Justices said
that at most they would join Justice O'Connor's view so the next
time the Court visits the issue Justice O'Connor's opinion could be-
come the clear holding of a majority of the Court.
72. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
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not enact onerous and unreasonable regulations. 73 Allowing the no-
tice rule would enable the state to enact such regulations and then
pay off some people and wait out the rest.74 People would be forced
to choose between finding money to fight the regulation or putting
the property up for sale at a steep discount. 75 This would put an ex-
piration date on the takings clause.76 Justice Kennedy used Nollan77
78
as precedent for the idea that transfer of title does not bar a claim.
He also added that for a regulation to become part of the back-
ground principles of a parcel's property rights there must be some-
thing more objective than one individual's purchase after the transfer
of title.79 The court failed, however, to articulate any criteria for
what would make a regulation part of the background principles of a
state's property laws by claiming that this was not the "occasion to
consider" that issue.
80
The Court's opinion does not explain what role post-regulation ac-
quisition should have in determining IBE. That question is the sub-
ject of debate between the two concurring opinions of Justices
O'Connor and Scalia.
While O'Connor joins the Court's opinion in its entirety, she ex-
plains her understanding of the role Post-regulation acquisition
should have in the Penn Central test. She says that a post-
enactment purchaser of a parcel cannot have his claim blocked
merely because his purchase was subsequent to the regulation.
However, the Penn Central IBE must be viewed in light of this con-
dition at the time of purchase. 82 She points out that that, in her view,
the error of the Rhode Island Supreme Court was that it raised IBE
to a "dispositive status". 8 3 The Penn Central test is "essentially an
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
78. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629. The Nollans had purchased the
property with notice of the regulation and were still allowed to press
their claim that the regulation was an unconstitutional taking. Id.
79. Id. at 630.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83. Id.
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ad hoc, factual inquiry" of which IBE is only one of the factors the
Court said should be weighed. 84 However, the existence of a regula-
tion at the time of the purchase of the property will have a major
impact on the reasonableness of those expectations, which is one of
the major parts of the Penn Central test. Justices Stevens and Gins-
burg, joined by Justices Breyer and Souter, stated in their dissents
that at the least they would join this view.85
Justice Scalia wrote his own concurrence to note that he disagrees
with Justice O'Connor's view of part II B of the Court's opinion.
86
He was bothered by the perception of fairness that is, in his view,
was the basis of Justice O'Connor's opinion. 87 He understood the
concept as that it is "unfair" for the new owner to reap such a big
profit on land he paid so little for. However he contends that this is
part of the way our economy works, people profit when they are
willing to take risks.
88
According to Justice Scalia, the fact that the purchaser had notice
of the regulation has no bearing on the analysis. 89 Except where the
regulation has already become part of the background principles the
change of title should have no bearing on the claim.90 He explained
that the right to sue belonged to the first owner and that when the
new owner takes over, the windfall should go to either one of the
owners (usually the new one who bargained for this right when he
purchased the property) but certainly not the government that en-
acted the unconstitutional regulations.
9 1
Justice Stevens opinion concurred that the case was ripe for re-
view, but dissented from part 11B, the finding of a taking.92 He ex-
plained that what is lacking from the Court's opinion is an under-
84. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633.
85. Id. at 643 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) and at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
90. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 639 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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standing of when the actual "taking" took place. 93 He defined a tak-
ing as a distinct event that takes place at a definite time and therefore
only the owner of record at that moment has standing to sue. 94 Un-
der the facts of this case, Justice Stevens defines the moment as the
time when the regulation was enacted, as that is the point when the
owner of the property lost the right to fill the wetlands. 95 "To the
extent that the adoption of the regulations constitute the challenged
taking, [the] petitioner is simply the wrong party to be bringing this
action."
96
He then addressed what the law would be if the taking only took
place before Palazzolo obtained title to the property. He said that in
that instance, the title Palazzolo received lacked the right to fill the
wetlands and therefore he has no standing to sue because he did not
lose any rights.97 What Justice Stevens failed to explain is if the
right to sue belongs to the original owner - in this case SGI - prop-
erty?
Justice Ginsburg's dissent, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer,
deals primarily with why the case was not ripe for review. She did
say, however, that had this case been ripe and properly presented on
the merits, she would join Justice O'Connor's opinion at the mini-
mum.
98
The final opinion is that of Justice Breyer. He started by saying he
agrees with Justice Ginsburg but felt the need to expand because the
Court addressed some issue that he thought should be commented
on.99  He stated that he generally would agree with Justice
O'Connor's view of how post-regulation acquisition should affect a
takings claim.'00  He noted that it should be one of the factors
"within the Penn Central framework."''1 1
93. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
94. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 641 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
98. Id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 654 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 654 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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C. Secondary Analysis of the Court's Opinion
Soon after the case was handed down, John Echeverria wrote an
article in the Environmental Law Reporter. 10 2 He states that his
views expressed therein are only based on a preliminary view of
what Palazzolo stands for. Stephen Eagle wrote another article a
few months later as a rebuttal of what Echeverria wrote about the
case.10 3 These two articles offer two divergent views of Palazzolo.
For the purposes of this paper I will only discuss the parts of their
articles that deal with IBE and OBR.
Echeverria attempts to view the case in light of the best way to
protect environmental legislation. He first acknowledges the demise
of the notice rule and is somewhat disappointed by it as it was one of
the few bright line rules in regulatory takings law.' °4 He then lim-
ited the holding only to those transactions where the transfer is by
the rule of law, but not to cases where the transfer was from an arms-
length business deal. 105 The point of this limitation on the holding of
Palazzolo is that in most cases the change of ownership is from an
arms-length deal and most of the time the new owner will not get the
benefit of Palazzolo. He also points out that the new notice rule is
not strictly applied against the government, as the wording in Nollan
suggests, allowing for the denial of some claims because the regula-
tion is so old or well-entrenched. These three observations are
Echeverria's hope that even with the strengthening of the rights of
property owners the government will still have room to deny people
the right to use their property in order to protect the environment.
His argument is supported by the vote counting: he notes that the
four dissenting Justices said they would support Justice O'Connor's
opinion; thus he says these five justices will read Palazzolo in a lim-
ited manner.' 06
102. John D. Echeverria, A Preliminary Assessment of Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER VOLUME YEAR
XXXI, September 2001 [hereinafter Echeverria].
103. Steven J. Eagle, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island: A Few Clear An-
swers and Many New Questions, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER
VOLUME YEAR XXXII, January 2002 [hereinafter Eagle].
104. Echeverria, supra note 71, at 27.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Eagle takes a different view of the case, and makes a clear argu-
ment for a more straightforward reading of the case He strongly
supports the rejection of the notice rule. He says that if the rule was
allowed to stand it would have the effect of turning various property
rights from ones held in fee simple to life estates.' 07 He also com-
ments that just because a rule is a bright line does not mean we
should not reject it if it has draconian results. °8 He next points out
that, while Echeverria argues that the rule is limited to transactions
that take place as a matter of law, nowhere in the opinions of the
Court or various Justices is there a hint that the rule is so limited.'0 9
While Eagle acknowledges that Justice O'Connor and the dissenting
Justices do make up a majority of the Court to reject a strict no no-
tice rule, he points out that the opinion of the Court is based in a
large part on Nollan and that the question was left open in the opin-
ion of the Court. 110 This is an observation Eagle makes with no clear
argument to support a stronger reading of the case.' 1
While both Echeverria and Eagle agree there is a great deal of
room for interpretation in the Palazzolo case, each one leans a dif-
ferent way, and tries to push the decision in favor of the social goals
he wishes to achieve.
D. Justices O'Connor and Scalia
The real question about the holding of Palazzolo is the difference
between the opinions of Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Because the
four dissenting justices all said that at the least they would agree
with Justice O'Connor, it would seem that when this issue is next
addressed by the Court, Justice O'Connor's opinion will become the
view of the Court. However, it is far from certain.
While the area in which Justices O'Connor and Scalia disagree is
quite wide, there are areas where they would agree. I will give a few
different scenarios and apply their respective opinions and explore
their argument.
To start, take a case where the regulation is relatively new. Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, we would add the fact that the regula-
107. Eagle, supra note 103, at 45.
108. Id. at 47.
109. Id. at 48.
110. Id. at 134.
111. Id.
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tion was new to the evaluation of the investment-backed expecta-
tions. 1 2 The timing of the regulation would be another factor in the
Penn Central analysis." 3 From here there are two possibilities. If
the new owner is allowed to assume that because the regulation is
new he is allowed to challenge the law, his IBE will still be reason-
able. Then, under Justice O'Connor's opinion, you would do the
rest of the Penn Central analysis because she emphasized that IBE it
to be one part of the analysis but not dispositive in either direction.
However, if you use the reasoning of the Federal Circuit in the Good
case, under which the owner must foresee possible future govern-
ment regulation, 114 then even though the law is new the owner might
still lack reasonable IBE. If the reasoning of the Federal Circuit in
Good is followed, then the next logical step is that even though the
owner is allowed to fight the regulation, because he must foresee
possible new regulation, so unless the new regulation was a com-
plete surprise, he would have no reasonable IBE and therefore IBE
would once again be almost dispositive. Due to Justice O'Connor's
concern with giving IBE a talismanic power, it is unlikely she would
agree with the reasoning from the Good case. She is concerned
about the savvy investor buying property just to sue for a regulatory
taking. However, when the regulation in question is new there is
less of a worry of the savvy investor procuring property at discount
rates because the old owner has not yet ruled out fighting the regula-
tion. She also points out that the courts should look to what sur-
rounding owners are allowed to do with their property, so if the abil-
ity to sue for the taking was part of the deal making considerations,
and the regulation is new so surrounding owners might also still be
attempting to fight it, she probably would allow the new owner
enough IBE to press a claim. However, her view would not let the
analysis stop there - one would still need to engage the remaining
112. Rith Energy v. U.S., 270 F.3d 1347 (2001). In the Rith case
the Federal Circuit looked to the industry in general, not just the ex-
act statute. The difference is when an industry has a history of regu-
lation but the exact action here was not previously proscribed, under
a Rith approach this would be enough to put an owner on notice that
the regulation might be forthcoming and therefore lessen his IBE.
This case shows how O'Connor's opinion can be read more expan-
sively. Id.
113. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. Good, 189 F.3d at 1361.
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elements of the Penn Central test. The reasonableness of the IBE is
only one part of that test. There still remains the other two factors to
consider before deciding if there was a taking. Only under a full
Penn Central analysis could the claim be granted."
15
In the same situation, Justice Scalia would give no value to the
timing of the regulation in terms of the expectations of the owner.
Whatever the owner planned to do when he purchased the property
would be his IBE. A Penn Central analysis would then be com-
pleted. At the end of his concurrence, Justice Scalia explicitly em-
braces Penn Central, but says that when evaluating IBE "the as-
sumed validity of a restriction" has no bearing." 16
Under Justice O'Connor's opinion, the Court would give more
leeway to the new owner's IBE because the regulation has not had
time to become entrenched, and the owner has a reasonable expecta-
tion to fight the regulation. Justice Scalia is not concerned with the
timing of the regulation. In this situation, the outcome would likely
be the same and the new owner could press an inverse condemnation
claim with reasonable expectations of challenging the regulation.
When the regulation question is one from the mid- 19th century, it
would be unreasonable to base your expectations on such an old ac-
cepted statute being declared unconstitutional according to Justice
O'Connor. Her approach is one of looking at the larger picture. It is
a much larger windfall when decades of owners have accepted a
regulation, and then some speculator is able to receive all the money
from the taking years after it happened. Justice O'Connor would
therefore find no reasonable IBE, which would weigh heavily on the
rest of the Penn Central analysis.
Justice Scalia's approach to such a situation is harder to appraise.
With an old and entrenched statute, it would possibly fall under the
"background principles of the state's law of property and nui-
sance",117 and therefore be part of the equation of the reasonableness
of the expectations according to Justice Scalia. He said, "In my view,
the fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title,
other than a restriction forming part of the background principles of
the State's law of property and nuisance." ' 18 However, there is also
115. Id.
116. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
117. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023.
118. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J. concurring) (emphasis
added).
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language in Justice Scalia's opinion in Nollan that no matter how
long after the regulation was enacted any subsequent owner can al-
ways challenge the constitutionality of the regulation. 119 Yet, Justice
Scalia does join the opinion of the Court, which implicitly says that
at some point legislative acts would become part of the background
principles.
120
It is possible that with a regulation so entrenched in the legal sys-
tem, Justice Scalia might consider it a background principle. If so,
there would be no argument between Justice Scalia and Justice
O'Connor in such a situation. It is almost as likely, however, that
Justice Scalia would say that the new owner could challenge the
regulation and then here is a situation where the two justices would
argue.
Another area where there definitely would be a disagreement arises
when the statute was already old (in terms of expectations), but not
yet a background principle. 12 However, even in this situation, any-
time the transfer of title was by operation of law and not a sale or
gift, the subsequent owner's expectations to develop might still be
reasonable according to Justice O'Connor. Justice Scalia would say
the expectations are still inapposite.
This situation is quite broad. Many of the cases that arise today
are from environmental legislation from the 1970s. On the facts of
Palazzolo, the statute in question is already 30 years old, yet Justice
O'Connor still joins the Court's opinion to say Palazzolo should
possibly receive compensation for a taking. She says the fact that he
acquired the property post-regulation is only used to evaluate the
reasonableness of his expectations, so any case where he acquired
title by operation of law it will add to the reasonableness of his ex-
119. "So long as the Commission could not have deprived the prior
owners of the easement without compensating them, the prior own-
ers must be understood to have transferred their full property rights
in conveying the lot." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.2.
120. "We have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances
when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle
of state law or whether those circumstances are present here." Palaz-
zolo, 533 U.S. at 619 (emphasis added).
121. This is not a small period of time. The Court has thus far de-
clined to explain when a rule will become a background principle, so
exactly how much time this encompasses is very much an open
question.
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pectations because he really did not have notice of the regulation
when he decided to acquire the property. It was forced on him as is.
Justice O'Connor talks about investment-backed expectations being
only one factor. She also wants to look at the extent of the regula-
tion and the general "fairness" of compensating in this particular
situation. However, had Palazzolo purchased the property from a
random owner, she would be less inclined to find a taking. Also,
had Palazzolo made money off other property in the area, she might
view the fairness differently because then he would have at least re-
ceived a partial return on his investment and it would not be as un-
fair just because he did not make as much he had hoped.
Justice Scalia would strongly disagree. He sees the government as
a thief unless the law is constitutional. Therefore, any subsequent
owner should be allowed to challenge the statute. He is not worried
about the fairness as between the two owners but rather of the fair-
ness between government regulations and a private landowner. He
points out in a footnote that even where the taking is for the best rea-
sons the government still has a responsibility to compensate the
owner that lost his property.
The final outcome will only be decided when the Court revisits the
issue.
IV. POST-PALAZZOLO LOWER COURT RULINGS
There were only been five cases that addressed post-regulation ac-
quisition since Palazzolo, at the time this note was written."' Each
dealt with the subject differently, and some only mentioned the doc-
trine in passing. I will state the holding of the two that elaborate on
the issue:
In Rith,1 23 the Federal Circuit distinguished the facts of that case
from the holding of Palazzolo. In Rith, a mining company had its
mining permit revoked because continued mining would have an
122. Rith Energy v. U.S., 270 F.3d 1347 (2001); Cole v. County of
Santa Barbara, 2001 WL 1613856 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. Dec 17, 2001);
ABKA Ltd. P'shp. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 635 N.W.2d 168
(Wis.App. 2001); Alviani v. Dixon, 365 Md. 95 (2001); E. Cape
May Assocs. v. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 343 N.J. Super. 110
(2001).
123. Rith Energy v. U.S., 270 F.3d 1347 (2001).
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adverse impact on the environment. As a result, Rith was only able
to mine about 9% of the available coal.
The court gave great weight to O'Connor's opinion and found that
reasonable investment-backed expectations is still quite relevant to a
takings analysis. They implicitly rejected Justice Scalia's position
without mentioning his concurrence, by using the Court's "blanket
rule" rejection on behalf of property owners to cover the states as
well. The court said that the Supreme Court wanted reasonable IBE
to be part of the equation, and as proof, the opinion cites Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion as the explanation as to what the
majority meant. 124 In accordance with the rest of Justice O'Connor's
opinion, the court also looked at the other factors of the Penn Cen-
tral test and found that Rith had still made a profit and the type of
harm the government was protecting was a traditional governmental
concern, and the court denied any takings claim. 1
25
In AKBA, 126 the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin accepted as settled
the idea that a successor in title completely fills the shoes of his
predecessor. The case came to the court as a review of an Adminis-
trative Law Judge's decision allowing a marina to convert a limited
amount of boat slips to "dockominiums" under a Department of
Natural Resources permit. The court said that it seems that if at any
point in the future the state wanted to change the conditions of the
ownership of the slips held under public trust, any subsequent owner
could challenge the states right to make those changes.127 The dis-
sent makes a strong point that Palazzolo is inapposite because the
original owner never had any rights in the water to transfer to the
new owners because it was held in public trust.1 28
These two cases are not enough evidence on how post-regulation
acquisition affects investment-backed expectations in light of Palaz-
zolo. However, Rith and AKBA do give two very different ways of
interpreting Palazzolo.
Rith relies heavily on Justice O'Connor's opinion. The Federal
Circuit examined the general coal mining industry and said that such
is a highly regulated industry. The court then looked at the fact that
124. Id. at 1350.
125. Id. at 1352.
126. ABKA Ltd. P'shp. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 635 N.W.2d
168 (Wis.App. 2001).
127. Id. at 181 n.6.
128. Id. at 184 n.2 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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Rith acquired the property after the regulations were in force. With
these two factors together, the court decided that his reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations were not high. The court also looked
at the money invested and the profit made on the land and said that,
although Rith did not achieve his goals, the transaction was profit-
able. This second part of the analysis is significant because it dem-
onstrates the court relied on more than the expectations of the owner,
but looked to the impact of the regulation as well. This is addressing
the concern of Justice O'Connor that lower courts were relying on
expectations and not looking at the other factors in the Penn Central
test. She wanted to ensure that IBE were not given talismanic pow-
ers but rather they were one factor of the greater Penn Central test.
By looking at the other factors and making them part of the evalua-
tion, the Rith court heeded Justice O'Connor advice.
In AKBA, the majority addresses Palazzolo in a footnote. 29 The
majority expresses the fear that allowing the transfer would lead the
new owners to sue if the state should ever exercise its right to the
area under the public trust doctrine.' They seem to pay no atten-
tion to how long that time would extend. The dissent does not dis-
agree on this point; rather, he disagrees as to the application of Pa-
lazzolo to this case.' 31 Here, the owner never had rights to the water.
His rights extended only to the land at the edge with the limited right
to establish a marina subject to the public trust.' 32 The public-trust
riparian owner never had any property rights in the water. This rule
is considered part of the background property rights of the state and
therefore Palazzolo is inapposite. 33 It seems that both opinions are
following Justice Scalia's approach. Consequently, can the current
owner challenge the 1993 act limiting property owner's rights to
place structures in the water?
These decisions illustrate the two most likely ways Palazzolo will
be interpreted by lower courts. It is too early to tell which of the two
- if either - will become the prevailing view. As mentioned before,
the prevailing view amongst courts that had dealt with the issue was
129. Id. at 181 nt. 6.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 184 n.2 (Brown, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. ABKA Ltd. P'shp, 635 N.W.2d at 184 n.2 (Brown, J., dissent-
ing).
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that notice of the regulation was fatal to a takings claim. It is doubt-
ful those courts would turn 180 degrees and now decide new cases in
accordance with Justice Scalia's opinion. The AKBA case shows,
there will be courts that agree with Justice Scalia. As more cases are
decided, a more clear picture of where the doctrine is headed shall
emerge.
V. CONCLUSION
IBE and OBR will remain an extremely important factor in the
Penn Central analysis. How they will be evaluated after Palazzolo
remains to be seen. Justice Scalia's approach is a simple, straight-
forward way to view the role of post-regulation acquisition. He
rightly notes the government acts as a thief when it fails to compen-
sate the property owner. However, one may argue Justice Scalia's
opinion favors too greatly the interests of the property owner as well.
Justice O'Connor's approach demonstrates the more middle ground.
Her opinion, however, grants the government too much latitude to
regulate without compensation. The only certainty is that post-
regulation acquisition is no longer immediately fatal to an inverse
condemnation claim. The most likely scenario is that Justice
O'Connor's opinion will become the consensus; however, as the
AKBA case demonstrates, there may be certain courts that will em-
brace Justice Scalia's opinion.
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